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Abstract We investigate the consistency and stability of individual risk preferences 
by manipulating cognitive resources. Participants are randomly assigned to an exper- 
iment session at a preferred time of day relative to their diurnal preference (circadian 
matched) or at a non-preferred time (circadian mismatched) and choose allocations 
between two risky assets [using the Choi et al. (Am Econ Rev 27(5):1921–1938, 2007), 
design]. We find that choices of circadian matched and mismatched subject are sta- 
tistically similar in terms of satisfying basic requirements for preference consistency. 
However, mismatched subjects tend to choose riskier asset bundles. 
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1 Introduction 
 
There is growing evidence that individual risk attitudes, as measured by economic 
experiments, vary across people and circumstances. These include life-cycle changes, 
traumatic personal or family experiences (Voors et al. 2012; Malmendier and Nagel 
2011; Callen et al. 2014), physical conditions (Garbarino et al. 2011; Wozniak et al. 
2014), priming and framing (Benjamin et al. 2010), cognitive ability (Dohmen et al. 
2010; Burks et al. 2009; Benjamin et al. 2013), the different way in which some may 
bracket choices (Read et al. 1999) and by ones’ genetic makeup (Cesarini et al. 2009). 
In this paper, we examine if temporary challenges to cognitive functioning yield 
choices that are consistent with rationality or whether differences in decisions are due 
to lapses in rational behavior broadly defined (e.g., choosing randomly). In partic- 
ular, we investigate whether a sleepiness manipulation through circadian mismatch, 
which is shown to be associated with impairment of cognitive abilities (Bodenhausen 
1990; Kruglanski and Pierro 2008; Dickinson and McElroy 2012), produces changes 
in preferences while maintaining consistency of behavior. A common assumption in 
standard economic models (e.g., Arrow-Debreu state-dependent preferences model, 
Mas-Collel et al. 1995), as well as behavioral models (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; 
Koszegi and Rabin 2007; Becker and Murphy 1988), is that changes in preferences 
can occur without the loss of rationality. Our experimental design provides empirical 
evidence to investigate this assumption. 
Circadian timing of decisions is a natural environment in which to test the stabil- 
ity and consistency of preferences. First, sleepiness has been widely studied in the 
sciences, and its effects on performance in many domains are well documented and 
understood.1 Second, it is a physical condition commonly experienced by most peo- 
ple at some, or many, period(s) of their lives. Because of this, circadian mismatch, 
compared to other ways to temporarily deplete cognitive resources, is a manipulation 
that is less likely to generate inconsistencies in behavior due to learning or adaptation 
to the circadian mismatch. This is important because such learning would confound 
an examination of preference consistency across states. 
The optimal time-of-day for alertness varies across individuals because of differ- 
ences in morning or evening diurnal preferences. While time-of-day preference may 
tend towards morning time as individuals age, it is considered largely independent of 
gender (see Paine et al. 2006). We, therefore, recruit only young men and women who 
are validated morning- and evening-type individuals.2 Morning- versus evening-type 
preference individuals are known to have daily alertness/sleepiness cycles that peak 
at different times-of-day (see Smith et al. 2002), independent of the sleep inertia that 
 
 
 
1 Total sleep deprivation studies are a more common approach to studying how sleepiness affects perfor- 
mance and decisions. However, circadian mismatch is a milder, and arguably more externally valid, way to 
examine sleepiness of the sort commonly experienced by real-world decision makers. Having to be awake 
at a time of day that is not optimal is more common and may affect performance in a less extreme manner 
than it would following 24 or more hours of total sleep deprivation in a relatively foreign sleep laboratory 
environment. 
2 Our sample is 95.9 % comprising young adults between 18 and 25 years old (99 % between 18 and 36 
years old). 
 
 
 
builds from cumulative hours awake.3 Importantly, results from this type of environ- 
ment should be relevant to policy. Understanding whether risky choice decisions while 
sleepy are rational or not and if preferences change could help inform the design of 
institutions and policies. 
Our research protocol is designed to reduce the issue of selection, and allow interpre- 
tation of our results due to temporary cognitive resource depletion. Specifically, once 
we identify morning- and evening-type subjects they are randomly assigned to a session 
(i.e., morning or evening session) and not allowed to select their own session time. This 
minimizes the problem of subjects selecting into session by time of day preference. 
To identify validated morning- and evening-type individuals, we invite by email 
all students at two large universities to complete an online survey (see Appendix 2A 
for full set of pre-screen survey questions). Within the survey, there is a validated 
instrument to measure diurnal preference (Adan and Almiral 1991). The data are then 
used to identify two classic diurnal preference groups: those who are naturally most 
alert in the morning and those who are naturally most alert in the evening. These 
morning types and evening types were then randomly assigned to one of two session 
times: early morning or late night. This produced two treatments, participants who 
were “matched” in terms of their circadian rhythm (e.g., morning type in a morning 
session and evening type in an evening session) and circadian “mismatched” (e.g., 
morning type in an evening session and evening type in a morning session). Partici- 
pants assigned to one session time were not allowed to switch to the other. Compliance 
with session assignment was voluntary and, importantly, we find no significant differ- 
ences in compliance across treatment conditions. Participants were allowed to take all 
the time they needed to make their decisions, and this was done to allow participants 
the opportunity to express their preferences unconstrained by time. 
Our results show a significant treatment effect on risk decisions, and as mentioned 
above, this is not due to selection or compliance across treatments. Circadian mis- 
matched participants have higher certainty equivalents for different risky asset bundles, 
indicating they are less risk-averse. Also, the variance in risky asset investment is larger 
for these subjects, showing a tolerance for more variability in payments. 
While the manipulation clearly worked as designed and affected preferences, it 
did not alter the likelihood a subject behaved rationally. Adherence to the gener- 
alized axiom of revealed preference (GARP) is identical between mismatched and 
matched participants.4 As a result, the estimated behavioral differences result cannot be 
attributed to an increase in noisiness of the data following circadian mismatch because 
an increase in noise would manifest in increased violations of choice consistency of 
 
 
 
3 It is also true that validated morning-type individuals are much more rare in young adult populations, such 
as our college student samples (Chelminski et al. 1997, 2000). Therefore, we recruit a higher proportion 
of the morning-types available in our student populations in order to achieve roughly equal numbers of 
morning-type and evening-type subjects in our final sample. 
4 Similarly, deviations from expected utility theory (EU) and rank-dependent utility theory with a concave 
utility function are also statistically similar across groups. These results are presented in Appendix 2C. 
We also examine whether subjects violate payoff dominance in making choices and, while both groups 
display some violations, there is no difference in violations between groups. In our data, consistency with 
rationality is robust. 
 
 
 
one sort or another. All of this suggests that preferences can be altered without altering 
adherence to rational behavior. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by showing that a slight manipulation of 
physical conditions, which has been shown to produce a temporary challenge to cogni- 
tion, produces changes in risk attitudes without producing a breakdown of rationality. 
The reader should note that our results, whereby we present a temporary cognitive 
resource challenge, are not meant to be directly compared to studies examining the 
impact of permanent cognitive abilities on risk taking (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2010; Burks 
et al. 2009; Frederick 2005).5 Our manipulation leads to higher certainty equivalents 
for mismatched subjects, indicating an increased preference for monetary risk when 
sleepy. Our experiment was not designed to identify the mechanism causing these 
effects. However, our results do show that the relationship between sleepiness and 
preferences is causal. 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to show that changes in preferences can 
occur without loss of rationality. The closest paper to ours is that of Burghart et al. 
(2013), who examine behavioral effects of alcohol intake but conclude that it does not 
impair rational decision-making. In our data, we do identify a change in risk preference 
in spite of no difference in rationality.6 
In Sect. 2, we describe the experimental design and the cognitive resource manipu- 
lation. Section 3 reports our results, first by confirming that our manipulation worked, 
and then examining rationality and choice behavior in the risk task. Finally, Sect. 4 
concludes. 
 
 
2 Experimental design 
 
2.1 The risky choice experiment environment 
 
We follow the design of Choi et al. (2007) for the risky choice task, which generates a 
rich set of individual-level data.7 In each decision round, subjects are asked to allocate 
tokens between two different accounts: X and Y. Tokens in account X only generate a 
payoff for the subject if account X is randomly chosen by the computer at the end of 
that decision round. Similarly, tokens in account Y only pay if account Y is randomly 
selected. We implement the “symmetric” treatment design of Choi et al. (2007) with 
a common knowledge 50 % probability that either account X or Y will be chosen. 
Because accounts X and Y are equally likely to be chosen, the accounts are perfect 
 
 
 
5 This other stream of research has shown that individuals with higher levels of permanent cognitive ability 
display an increased propensity to take monetary risk. While interesting, this is fundamentally distinct from 
our question of how temporary depletion of available cognitive resources will impact risky choice and/or 
rationality. 
6 Our design includes 50 decisions per subject and provides more statistical power, which increases our 
confidence in the finding that rationality is not altered by our manipulation. Also, in our design, participants 
were randomly assigned to treatments (circadian mismatched or matched), and this reduces the possibility 
that participants self-select into the experiment based on certain characteristics (e.g., rationality). 
7 We are grateful to Sachar Kariv for providing us with the code for the experiment task. Subject instructions 
for the experiment are included in Appendix 1. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  Sample stimuli 
 
 
substitutes for one another. Figure 1 shows a sample stimulus where the subject makes 
an allocation choice on a computer interface using a mouse-driven pointer to drag 
point C along the line AB to their desired choice location (including the endpoint 
locations, if desired). An allocation such as point A or point B is a risky choice with 
all tokens placed in one account. Thus, the subject would only receive a payoff if 
the computer randomly selects the account where all the tokens are allocated. An 
intermediate allocation of tokens, such as point C in Fig. 1, places some tokens in 
each account, which guarantees the subject a smaller, but sure, payoff in both states 
of the world. A choice along the X = Y line in Fig. 1 is a perfectly safe portfolio that 
guarantees the same payoff no matter which state of the world applies. 
The experiment consists of 50 decision rounds (i.e., 50 different stimuli) where 
the slope and intercept of the AB line are randomly determined for each stimulus.8 
After all 50 rounds are complete, one round is randomly selected for payment, and 
each round has an equal probability of being chosen. The randomly selected payoff- 
round, the computer’s random selection of account X or Y, and the subject’s allocation 
decision for that round determine the subject’s payoffs. 
Subjects complete a questionnaire to assess their current level of sleepiness before 
starting the experiment and also upon completion of the decision task. They also 
respond to several self-report sleep questions and complete a cognitive reflection task 
(CRT) after the decision task (see Appendix 2B). 
 
2.2 The cognitive resource manipulation 
 
We use a circadian match/mismatch protocol to represent a temporary challenge to 
cognitive resources. While there may be other ways to temporarily deplete resources, 
 
 
8 For the first eight sessions, the X and Y intercepts were constrained to lie in the [50, 100] interval (see 
Fig. 1). For the latter eight sessions, in order to generate more extreme relative prices, the budgets were 
chosen among the set of lines that intersect both axes below 100 and intersect at least one axis at or above 
the 50-token level. The initial starting point for the mouse-pointer along each budget line was also randomly 
determined. See Choi et al. (2007) for full details. 
 
 
 
our method has broad applicability to circumstances encountered in daily life, has been 
previously used and validated in the literature, and is relatively easy to administer. 
Previous research has shown that single-vehicle accidents increase at times of the 
day where the typical circadian rhythm dictates sleepiness due to natural release of 
melatonin (Coren 1996). In controlled experimental settings, researchers have found 
that sleep-deprived individuals take on more risk than well-rested individuals when 
choosing between risky lotteries (McKenna et al. 2007). A more recent study shows 
that increased risk taking when totally sleep deprived may be specific to male subjects 
(Ferrara et al. 2015). In a different risky choice task, Venkatraman et al. (2007) found 
neural effects in sleep-deprived subjects even in the absence of behavioral effects. 
Though sleep loss and circadian timing may both contribute to depleted cognitive 
resources with symptomatic sleepiness, a 24-h total sleep deprivation protocol likely 
depletes cognitive resources to a greater extent than what individuals commonly expe- 
rience on a daily basis and may, therefore, not be applicable to a large segment of the 
population. Decision making at sub-optimal times of the day is more externally valid, 
and hence motivates our choice of the circadian mismatch protocol. 
Explicit circadian mismatch protocols like we propose have been used in behavioral 
research to some extent, but this area is relatively unexplored. Bodenhausen (1990) 
showed that individuals are more likely to use stereotypes in making judgments when 
at circadian mismatched times, and Kruglanski and Pierro (2008) reported an increased 
use of the psychological transference effect among subjects tested at circadian mis- 
matched times. Dickinson and McElroy (2010) and Dickinson and McElroy (2012) 
used two distinct protocols to manipulate the circadian timing of decision in guessing 
games, and find that choices made at circadian mismatched times generally produce 
outcomes farther from the predicted Nash equilibrium. Though limited, the extant liter- 
ature on circadian mismatch effects is consistent with the hypothesis that circadian mis- 
match alters decision making in a way consistent with cognitive resource depletion.9 
To implement the circadian mismatch protocol for our current study, we first admin- 
ister a large-scale online survey at two large universities. The objective of the survey 
is to generate a database of individuals for whom we have a validated measure of 
their diurnal preference, which is assessed in the survey using the short form of the 
morningness–eveningness questionnaire, henceforth rMEQ (Adan and Almiral 1991). 
The rMEQ classifies individuals on a scale of 4–25, with morning-types having rMEQ 
score from 18 to 25 and evening-types having rMEQ score from 4 to 11. While this 
diurnal preference measure is based on self-reports of the subjects, it has been vali- 
dated against physiological data on oral temperatures (see Horne and Östberg 1976) 
and is a standard tool in circadian research. 
From our database, we recruit morning-types and evening-types, who we had ran- 
domly assigned, ex ante, to participate in either a morning (7:30 a.m.) or an evening 
(10:00 p.m.) experiment session. This resulted in 57 % of our sample being circadian 
 
 
 
9 To be more specific, depletion of cognitive resources would disproportionately affect executive function. 
The behavioral effects reported in the aforementioned studies either involve increased reliance on heuristics 
(i.e., stereotyping and transference effect) or decreased ability to engage in strategic reasoning (i.e., the 
guessing game), both of which are consistent with reduced engagement of deliberate thought regions of the 
brain that rely on fully intact cognition. 
 
 
 
Table 1  Sample size per design cell 
 
 
Morning session Evening session 
 
 
Morning-type 32 + 22 = 54 29 + 23 = 52 
Evening-type 24 + 11 = 35 33 + 28 = 61 
Total sample size = 202 
Matched obs = 115, Mismatched obs = 87 
 
 
(Site 1 + Site 2 = total sample size), Mismatched (depleted cognitive resource) cells located in off-diagonal 
 
matched for the risky choice experiment.10 If a subject could not participate in the ran- 
domly assigned time-slot (morning or evening), the subject was not allowed the option 
of the alternative time-slot—an alternative time-slot was not even mentioned in recruit- 
ment. This aspect of our design eliminates selection into treatments and allows for a 
more causal interpretation of cognitive resource depletion on outcomes. Importantly, 
we find no evidence of selection in show-up rates across the matched and mismatched 
subjects. The proportion of subjects who actually showed up for the session they signed 
up for is not significantly different across our matched and mismatched subjects (the 
p value of a Chi-square test of difference in distribution is 0.516).11 
In total, 202 subjects (102 men, 100 women) participated in this study. Table 1 
shows the distribution of our sample across experiment locations for each design 
cell.12 The experiment sessions lasted just over an hour, and included the risky choice 
task administration as well as a few short survey instruments to elicit self-reported 
measures of recent sleep habits (shown in Appendix 2B). Average subject payoffs 
were $22.56 (s.d. $9.61), which includes a $5 show up fee. 
 
3 Results 
 
3.1 Summary statistics and manipulation check 
 
Table 2 shows relevant summary statistics of our sample. Pre-experiment survey data 
refer to responses from the online sleep survey administered as a way of building our 
database of morning-type and evening-type subjects. Pre-experiment survey responses 
would have been given several days to several weeks before the decisions experiments. 
 
 
10 Due to the rarity of true morning-type subjects—less than 10 % in young adult populations are morning- 
types (see Chelminski et al. 2000)—we extend our rMEQ cutoff to include rMEQ scores of 15–17. To 
compensate, we only recruit the more extreme (and still abundant) evening-type subjects with rMEQ scores 
from 4 to 10. In this way, our sample is still drawn from the tails of the rMEQ distribution and eliminates 
the same amount of support from the non-tail portion of the rMEQ distribution compared to if we had used 
the traditional morning-type cutoff (rMEQ = 18) but included non-extreme evening types (rMEQ = 11) in 
our sample. 
11 One-hundred and thirty-seven matched subjects signed up for experimental sessions, and 115 showed 
up. One-hundred and ten mismatched subjects signed up for experimental sessions, and 87 showed up. 
12 Men and women were equally distributed across the matched and mismatched groups (matched: 62 
men, 53 women; Mismatched: 40 men, 47 women) and there is no significant difference in the distributions 
(Fisher’s exact test, p value = 0.320) 
 
 
 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of sample 
 
Circadian matched 
(n = 115) 
 
Circadian 
mismatched 
(n = 87) 
 
p value for diff in 
means test (t test) 
 
 
Pre-experiment survey 
Avg hours of sleep 6.8 6.8 0.9195 
Hours slept last night 6.8 6.8 0.8048 
Optimal hours of sleep 8.0 7.9 0.8357 
Epworth trait-level sleepiness score 
(0–24, higher numbers indicate 
chronic fatigue) 
Post-experiment survey 
7.6 7.4 0.5855 
 
Avg hours of sleep over last 7 days 7.1 6.7 0.0382 
Hours slept last night 6.7 6.2 0.0515 
Optimal hours of sleep 8.0 8.0 0.8150 
Epworth trait-level sleepiness score 
(0–24, higher numbers indicate 
chronic fatigue) 
8.0 8.4 0.3600 
Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) 
score (0–3) 
1.56 1.68 0.4677 
Manipulation checks 
Avg state-level sleepiness rating 
during experiment (Karolinska 
scale) (1=extremely alert, 
9=extremely sleepy) 
Avg decision response time in 
seconds (std dev of mean in 
parentheses) 
 
4.5 5.7 0.0000 
 
 
 
9.4 (4.07) 10.2 (5.00) 0.2157 
Distribution of response times Kolmogorov– 
Smirnov test 
for difference in 
distributions p 
value = 0.002 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 includes summary statistics for the same questions asked in the pre-experiment 
survey and after subjects had completed the risky choice task but before payments were 
revealed (section labeled “post-experiment”). These include self-reports of the sub- 
jects’ average nightly sleep over the 7-days prior to the experiment, average sleep the 
night prior to the experiment, one’s subjective optimal hours of nightly sleep required 
for peak performance, and the Epworth Sleepiness scale used commonly in sleep 
research (a measure of trait-level sleepiness, or chronic fatigue). As can be seen in 
the top panel, there are no significant differences in any of these descriptive mea- 
sures between the circadian matched and mismatched subjects in the pre-experiment 
 
 
survey. 
In the post-experiment survey data in Table 2, we find that circadian mismatched 
subjects report being significantly more sleep restricted than circadian matched sub- 
 
 
 
jects. We attribute this to factors particular to the morning sessions, when sleep level 
difference likely results from circadian matched subjects following a more typical 
schedule the evening prior to the experiment compared to mismatched (evening-type) 
subjects. Specifically, evening-type subjects mismatched to the morning session more 
likely restricted their sleep to wake early for the experiment. Truncation of the pre- 
vious night’s sleep due to our experiment schedule is not an issue with scheduling of 
circadian matched subjects (e.g., a morning-type subject in the morning session more 
likely had a typical level of sleep before the experiment). This same issue is not present 
in our evening sessions, whether both morning-types and evening-types could have 
slept; however, they pleased the night before. This explanation is consistent with our 
data that show the lowest average nightly sleep levels among evening-type subjects in 
the morning sessions (n = 36 subjects: mean nightly sleep = 5.26 ± 1.28 h). Finally, 
we note that our mismatched subjects reporting significantly more sleep restriction 
only serve to amplify the adverse cognitive resource state we intended to manipu- 
lation. It also highlights the complexity of trying to separately manipulate circadian 
effects from sleep level effects in an experimental design of this nature. 
Because our objective is to introduce a randomized assignment of cognitive resource 
availability, we present evidence that our circadian manipulation was successful. 
The manipulation checks in Table 2 reveal that circadian mismatched subjects, who 
presumably have depleted cognitive resources, report significantly higher state-level 
sleepiness. There is no significant difference in the score on the CRT task across the 
two groups. Matched and mismatched subjects do not differ in average length of time to 
make decisions. However, the median response time and distribution of time to make 
decisions are different.13 We also confirm that, on average, circadian matched and 
mismatched subjects faced similar menus—average intercepts of randomly generated 
budget lines in Fig. 1 do not significantly differ in mean or variance across.14 
In sum, we validate that our sleepiness manipulation worked and the decision envi- 
ronment for our matched and mismatched subjects was the same. 
 
 
 
 
13 There is no a priori reason why sleepy subjects would be expected to make faster or slower decisions. 
While some dual systems frameworks identify longer response times with more deliberate thinking, in the 
case of sleepiness, longer response times might also reflect difficulty focusing on the decisions. A recent 
theoretical framework of response times (Achtziger and Alós-Ferrer 2014) allows an initial stage of decision 
making where individuals first decide whether to use automatic or deliberative thinking. As such, overall 
response times are not suitable for identifying whether individuals are using more automatic or deliberative 
thought processes in our design, which was never intended to produce such informative response time data. 
Mismatched subjects are slower in responding when relative prices for the two assets are close to one. 
This could reflect that sleepiness makes it more difficult to choose between similar options or could reflect 
some kind of indifference that is exacerbated for sleepy subjects (Krajbich et al. 2015, document slower 
response times for decisions over options for which a subject may be indifferent). The median response 
time of matched subjects is 7 s and the median response time of mismatched subjects is 8 s. 
14 A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for difference in the distribution of the maximum intercept (max amount 
a person can put in one asset) that matched and mismatched subjects saw shows no significant difference. 
The test was run separately for the first 8 sessions and the last 8 sessions because these differed in the budget 
generation process (see footnote 8). The p value for the first 8 sessions is 0.674 and for the last 8 sessions 
is 0.868. The same distribution test was also run for the slope (relative prices) for the two sets of sessions, 
and there is no significant difference (p value = 0.77 and 0.218) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2  Distribution of critical cost to efficiency Index (CCEI) for matched and mismatched subjects (blue 
bars) and for random choices (yellow bars) 
 
3.2 Consistency of behavior 
 
We look first at rationality and then choices in the risk task. We test for consistency of 
choices with rationality for matched and mismatched subjects using several measures 
of rational behavior. Specifically, we test if subjects satisfy the Generalized Axiom 
of Revealed Preferences (GARP: Afriat 1972; Varian 1983) and payoff dominance.15 
This examination of choice rationality provides a test of whether there is an increase in 
the noise of the choice data when sleepy. Noisier choice data would result in increased 
violations of GARP and payoff dominance. As we will see below, this is not the case. 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the Critical Cost to Efficiency Index, CCEI 
(Afriat 1972) for matched and mismatched subjects. This index measures how much 
budget constraints would need to be adjusted to eliminate all violations of GARP. 
CCEI values equal to one indicate “rational” behavior in the sense that no adjustment 
needs to be made to a budget constraint in order to eliminate a violation of GARP. 
As a point of reference as to how the CCEI measures rational choices, the figure 
also shows the distribution of CCEI for random choices. This distribution is shown 
in light bars, and the distribution for subject choices is shown in blue bars. The two 
 
 
15 Additional tests of rationality (expected utility and rank-dependent utility with a concave utility 
function) produce the same results. More information and technical details on the tests we performed are 
given in Appendix 2C. The main conclusion is that we find no significance difference between matched and 
mismatched subjects using a variety of definitions of rationality or adherence to common utility preference 
frameworks. 
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distributions are significantly different (Chi-square test of difference in distribution p 
value=0.000), which shows that subject choices in the experiment violate GARP less 
often than would be expected from random choices.16 
Looking at the CCEI’s of subjects, Fig. 2 shows that 13 % of matched and mis- 
matched subjects satisfied GARP without having to modify any budget (CCEI = 1). 
An additional 21 % of the matched subjects and 22 % of the mismatched subjects 
require a small change in the budgets to satisfy GARP (CCEI above 0.999). All told, 
78 % of the matched subjects and 83 % of the mismatch subjects have indices strictly 
above 0.9. Indeed, the distribution of the CCEI is not significantly different between 
these two groups (rank sum test of difference in distributions p value = 0.7805). That 
is, slight cognitive resource depletion does not cause an increase in the distant to 
rationality, as measured by the CCEI. 
Adherence to payoff dominance makes clear predictions in the context of this 
choice task. Namely, all choices on the short side (e.g., above the X = Y line in 
Fig. 1) of the budget line would violate payoff dominance in the sense that one is 
strictly worse off by choosing such bundles compared to bundles on the long side 
of the budget line. This is true due to the fact that in our design asset X and asset 
Y are perfect substitutes, and so a subject choosing any asset bundle that is not 
on the X = Y (safe bundle) line should always choose the bundle with the higher 
expected payoff. Similar reasoning explains why bundle A should never be chosen 
over bundle B in Fig. 1. Both bundles involve a 50 % chance of receiving a zero 
payoff, but the possible 50 % payout is higher with bundle B. Our data set provides 
ample observations to examine violations of payoff dominance in our two experimental 
groups. 
Table 3 presents the contingency table of violations of payoff dominance for the 
steep versus flat budget constraints (the rows), and it does so for the case of the 
entire data set as well as subsets of the data for which relative prices are quite close 
(the columns). The importance of investigating relatively close price ratios is because 
violations of dominance are less severe in those cases, at least in terms of the mag- 
nitude of the expected payoff loss. Observing significant differences across matched 
and mismatched participants for close price ratios would be a strong test for noisy 
decision making. Fisher’s exact tests are performed for each column represented in 
Table 3. 
Two things are clear from Table 3. First, there are a significant number of violations 
of payoff dominance. It is violated roughly 1/3 of the time for the set of all budget 
constraints and, not surprisingly, dominance is violated more frequently as we con- 
strain the data to the set of relative prices closer to one (i.e., the 
1
 
( 
Px 
\1 
< 0.10 
and 
1
 
( 
Px 
\1
 17 1 PY     1 
1ln 1 PY   1 < 0.05 subsamples). 
That is, as expected, violations increase as the 
cost of a violation decreases. The second observation from Table 3 is that there is no 
16 We only consider positive prices in all the analyses in the paper. Out of the 10,100 choices made in 
the experiment (50 choices per subject × 202 subjects), 10,094 were with strictly positive prices as our 
failure to constrain the random price choice in the parameterization of the experiment inadvertently led to 
 
 
6 instances of zero-priced assets. 
17 We use the log because it gives the percentage change of relative prices [e.g., log(1.10) ≈ 0.10]. 
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Table 3  Consistency versus Violations of Payoff Dominance: Matched vs. Mismatched subject Fisher tests 
of proportions for each category (number listed, proportion of sample in parenthesis) 
 
 
Category These columns examine subsets of bud- 
get lines reflecting smaller differences 
between the prices of assets X and Y (i.e., 
budget lines with slopes closer to -1) 
All ln 
( 
Px 
\ 1
 ( 
Px 
\1 1   ( 
Px 
\1 
ln 
PY 1 PY   1 < 0.10 
1ln 1 
1 < 0.05 
Y    1 
(n = 10,100) (n = 2203) (n = 1156) 
Relatively cheap X NMatched = 2128 NMatched = 371 NMatched = 193 
Dominance consistent 
choice 
(73.46 %) (57.61 %) (53.76 %) 
 
NMismatched = 1647 NMismatched = 295 NMismatched = 143 
(74.42%) (59.84%) (55.21%) 
Relatively cheap Y NMatched = 2208 NMatched = 393 NMatched = 204 
Dominance consistent 
choice 
(77.39 %) (63.80 %) (63.75 %) 
 
NMismatched = 1687 NMismatched = 311 NMismatched = 140 
(78.94 %) (69.11 %) (64.22 %) 
Relatively cheap X NMatched = 769 NMatched = 273 NMatched = 166 
Dominance violated choice (26.54 %) (42.39 %) (46.24 %) 
NMismatched = 566 NMismatched = 198 NMismatched = 116 
(25.58 %) (40.16 %) (44.79 %) 
Relatively cheap Y NMatched = 645 NMatched = 223 NMatched = 116 
Dominance violated choice (22.61 %) (36.20 %) (36.25 %) 
NMismatched = 450 NMismatched = 139 NMismatched = 78 
(21.06 %) (30.89 %) (35.78 %) 
Fisher’s exact test 0.465 0.247 0.948 
 
 
 
 
significant difference in propensity to violate dominance between circadian matched 
and mismatched participants (see Fisher’s test results in bottom row of Table 3). Vio- 
lations of dominance are actually uniformly lower among the circadian mismatched 
group, but the Fisher’s exact tests show no statistically significant differences. These 
results complement the rather extensive examination of consistency with other defin- 
itions of rationality (see Appendix 2C), but all tests in this section point to the same 
result. 
Result 1 Cognitive resource depletion via circadian mismatch does not affect choice 
consistency 
In summary, we find that distance to rational behavior across circadian matched 
and mismatched subjects is similar regardless of the test of rational behavior we 
conduct. When testing the data’s consistency with GARP, for which there are some 
CCEI benchmarks in the literature, both our circadian matched and mismatched 
groups would be deemed “rational.” We now examine if consistency in behavior, 
whether cognitively challenged or not, also implies that choices in the risk task are the 
same. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3  Share of assets in Y for all relative prices: matched and mismatched subjects 
 
 
3.3 Choices in the risk task 
 
In light of the absence of a discernible difference in consistency of behavior, in this 
section, we investigate whether the circadian mismatch manipulation affects risky 
choices. We look at the distribution of asset investments, from which we calculate 
certainty equivalents for subjects. These certainty equivalents constitute a theoretically 
valid measure of risk preference. 
Because deviations from expected utility theory might manifest through nonlinear 
responses to prices, we take these factors into consideration in the analysis that follows. 
In particular, subjects might choose a distribution of assets that favors constant payoffs. 
Therefore, small variations in relative prices will have a different impact on asset 
allocations than large changes in relative prices. It will be important to examine the 
behavior in these extremes. 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the proportion of the budget share in asset Y 
for all relative prices for matched and mismatched subjects. Matched subjects tend 
to more frequently choose asset allocations that secure equal payoffs across states 
of nature. Thus, matched subjects choose the safe bundle more frequently, which is 
an indication of increased risk aversion relative to circadian mismatched subjects.18 
 
 
18 Given the mouse-driven graphical choice interface, one might think that sleepy subjects would be less 
likely to choose safe asset bundles due to motor skill deficits resulting from fatigue. We note that this is not 
likely the case in our data. However, because that argument would imply that these same sleepy subjects 
are more likely to choose extreme border asset bundles. This is not the case in our data. 
 
 
 
Table 4  Interquantile regression on share in Y (Y/(Y+X)) 
 
Variables No bootstrap Bootstrap at the 
subject level 
Mismatched 0.085*** 0.085** 
 [0.012] [0.042] 
 (0.000) (0.041) 
Constant 0.107*** 0.107*** 
 [0.008] [0.023] 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 10,094 10,094 
Standard errors in brackets, p values in parentheses. Only decisions over positive prices are included 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
The significance of this result is tested and shown in Table 4. This table shows the 
results of an interquantile regression of budget share on a dummy variable for being 
a mismatched subject. The interquantile range of budget share in the Y asset is 8.5 % 
points larger than that of matched subjects. Mismatched subjects are significantly more 
likely to make riskier investments.19 
To more rigorously assess differences in risk aversion, we calculate non-parametric 
certainty equivalents for the matched and mismatched subject groups. The certainty 
equivalent gives us the amount of money an individual would be indifferent to receiving 
for sure instead of taking the lottery. Because a relatively more risk averse individual 
would be willing to take a lower amount of money than the expected value of the lottery, 
the certainty equivalent gives another measure of risk aversion. To implement this idea, 
we estimate the certainty equivalent for a particular risky lottery as the highest payoff 
“safe bundle” (i.e., equal payoffs across states) that would be less preferred to the non- 
equal payoff “risky” lottery and still be consistent with GARP. That is, we look for all 
sets of relative prices that would support the “risky” lottery without violating GARP 
and pick the set of relative prices that include the highest possible “safe bundle.” This 
highest “safe bundle” is our certainty equivalent measure. So, the more risk averse an 
individual is, the lower the “safe bundle” would be to make them switch. Finally, calcu- 
lating certainty equivalents requires subjects to be consistent. So, since many subjects 
have some violation of GARP, we adjust the revealed preferred relation according to 
the subject’s CCEI. In particular, all the calculations define a bundle x at prices p to be 
revealed preferred to y if CCEI(i)*p*x ≥ p*y, where CCEI(i) is subject i’s CCEI.20 
 
 
19 If we add a dummy variable for being female as an additional control in the regressions in Table 4, our 
main results still hold. The coefficient on being mismatched is 0.082 (p value = 0.000 in the non-bootstrapped 
regressions and =0.062 in the bootstrapped regressions) and the coefficient on female is −0.023 (p value = 
0.059 in non-bootstrapped regression and =0.602 in the bootstrapped regressions). Women are more risk 
averse than men, but the effect is not always significant. Results are also robust if we control for amount of 
sleep the night before the experiment or the subject’s CRT score. 
20 As a robustness check, we evaluate our results on the differences in certainty equivalents between 
matched and mismatched subjects by also constraining the sample to subjects whose CCEI is close to one. 
Our main result, that matched subjects are more risk averse, still holds. The result is no longer statistically 
significant though, and that is a reflection of the smaller number of observations in the constrained sample. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4  Differences in certainty equivalents (CE) for different asset bundles as a proportion of the expected 
value of the lottery for mismatched versus matched subjects 
 
 
The results from calculating these certainty equivalents are shown in Fig. 4. The 
average certainty equivalent (CE) for matched and mismatched subjects is calculated 
for each asset bundle, and Fig. 4 shows the difference of these CEs between mismatched 
and matched subjects relative to the expected value of the lottery. This shows how much 
larger the CE is for mismatched compared to matched subjects in percentage points. 
The general path of where these differences lie is along the range of actual available 
lotteries seen in the experiment. What is clear from these data is that mismatched 
individuals have higher calculated certainty equivalents than matched individuals, 
especially for extreme lotteries that are far from the sure payoff lottery. In other words, 
matched subjects are more risk averse than mismatched subjects. 
We test for the significance of these differences in Table 5. This table shows results 
for Tobit regressions of the CE on a dummy variable for being mismatched for various 
sets of relative prices.21 The first column includes all the data and shows that mis- 
matched subjects have a 4.4 % point larger CE than matched subjects. The second col- 
umn confirms this results when the data are restricted to include relative prices strictly 
different from one. Columns 3–6 further restrict the data to include only progressively 
 
 
21 The Tobit regression takes the calculated certainty equivalent for an individual for a given lottery and 
regresses it on a dummy variable for being mismatched. There are 361 possible generated lotteries for each 
individual and 202 individuals, yielding 72,922 observations, and the regressions cluster at the individual 
level. 
 
 
 
Table 5  Tobit estimates of the certainty equivalents as a proportion of the expected value of the lottery 
 
Variables All lotteries X I= Y ln(x/y)|> 
|ln(1/1.1)| 
|ln(x/y)|> 
|ln(1/10)| 
|ln(x/y)|> 
|ln(1/100)| 
Mismatched 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044 0.067 0.088 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.033] [0.049] [0.061] 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.178) (0.172) (0.148) 
Constant 3.188*** 3.186*** 1.890*** 2.174*** 2.188*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.129] [0.167] [0.149] 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 72,922 71,710 65,852 10,504 6868 
Dummy variables per lottery included, 202 clusters (subjects). Robust standard errors in brackets, p values 
in parentheses 
 
Table 6  Price elasticity on y/(y + x) 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
ln(py/px) −0.160*** 
[0.007] 
(0.000) 
ln(py/px)*Mismatched −0.026** 
[0.012] 
(0.028) 
Mismatched 0.002 
[0.007] 
(0.710) 
Constant 0.503*** 
[0.005] 
(0.000) 
Observations 10,094 
R-squared 0.387 
 
 
Robust standard errors in brackets, p value in parentheses. Errors clustered at the subject level. 
Only decisions over positive prices are included. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
 
 
more extreme relative prices. Mismatched subjects have higher CE than matched sub- 
jects, but this is only significant in a one-sided test. This leads to our second result: 
Result 2 Cognitive resource depletion via circadian mismatch leads to higher cer- 
tainty equivalents (i.e., increased preference for risk). 
As a further check, we examine how price responsiveness varies across groups. 
Table 6 shows regressions of price elasticity on relative prices, a dummy for being mis- 
matched and an interaction term of relative prices on being mismatched. The significant 
negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates that mismatched subjects appear 
more sensitive to changes in relative asset prices than matched subjects. This implies 
that more steep (flat) budget lines in Fig. 1 lead mismatched subjects to alter their cho- 
sen asset bundles even further towards the cheaper asset than would a matched subject. 
 
 
 
Another interpretation of this result is that mismatched subjects are less sensitive to 
the risk of the low (zero) payoff than matched subjects when budget lines reflect large 
relative price differences. It is also the case that any budget slope other than -1 would 
lead a risk neutral expected value maximizing subject to choose a corner solution. The 
Table 6 result is, therefore, consistent with the hypothesis that mismatched subjects 
take more risks because they are more desensitized to risk, which is a result reported 
previously in the literature using totally sleep-deprived subjects (McKenna et al. 2007). 
In sum, we find that our sleepiness manipulation leads to lower risk aversion as 
measured by certainty equivalent. This result is consistent with other literature exam- 
ining extreme forms of temporary cognitive resource depletion effects on incentivized 
risky choice tasks, such as total sleep deprivation (e.g., McKenna et al. 2007; Ferrara 
et al. 2015) or intoxication (e.g., Lane et al. 2004). Importantly, despite the shift in 
risk attitudes, we do not find any significant difference in decision-making rationality 
resulting from circadian mismatch, under several alternative definitions of consistency. 
The simultaneous examination of risky choice and rationality is an important contribu- 
tion of our paper, because we document that the increased tendency to take monetary 
risk due to circadian mismatch is not due to increased randomness of decisions. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we investigate how a particular form of cognitive resource depletion 
impacts choice consistency and outcomes in a risky choice task. The task (Choi et al. 
2007) generates data that allow us to evaluate choice consistency with respect to several 
different measures of rationality. As a result, our contribution is that we are able to 
establish whether differences in preferences over risky asset bundles are the result 
of “irrationality”, or whether they are the result of state-dependent preferences. We 
find that they are due to the latter. The circadian mismatch protocol we implement 
to manipulate cognition is not only effective, but also externally valid and similar to 
what decision makers face in field environments. While much of the recent literature 
has focused on how permanent cognitive levels may correlate with risk preferences, 
we address how temporary fluctuations in available cognitive resources may affect 
choice, independent of permanent abilities. 
Our results are significant and reveal evidence that randomly assigned circadian 
mismatch subjects are no less rational than matched subjects, and yet preferences for 
risk shift. Specifically, we have shown that choices are no more or less consistent 
with GARP or payoff dominance theories as a result of the subject being circadian 
mismatched. And yet, these mismatched subjects are more willing to accept risky asset 
bundles compared to matched subjects. 
This is an important result with practical and policy implications, especially if one 
considers that many real-world decision makers face even more serious bouts of sleepi- 
ness than the relatively mild manipulation we implement. In the realm of monetary 
risk choice, sleep deprivation is estimated to affect over 25 % of workers in the finan- 
cial and insurance industries (CDC 2012). In such industries, any increased tendency 
to take risk may have significant consequences. In other occupations, risky choice 
may not involve explicit monetary risk (e.g., air traffic controllers, long-haul trucking, 
medical practice, or emergency service workers), but sleepiness is commonplace and 
 
 
 
of great concern to policymakers establishing regulations that may involve prescribed 
rest or time-off to avoid sleep deprivation or limit shift work. 
If one considers the other various forms of temporary cognitive challenges we often 
face (e.g., multi-tasking, stress, time pressure), this research may have even more wide 
reaching implications. We leave it to future research to establish the relationship, if 
any, between various distinct forms of cognitive resource manipulations, or between 
cognition effects on monetary risk preference versus other choice domains. Nonethe- 
less, it is clear that this area of research is fertile ground for studying choice in the real 
world where cognitive resources are not uniformly available at all times. 
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Appendix 1: Subject Instruction 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision making. Your payoffs will depend partly on your 
decisions and partly on chance. Your payoffs will not depend on the decisions of the 
other participants in the experiment. Please pay careful attention to the instructions as 
a considerable amount of money is at stake. 
The entire experiment should be completed within an hour and a half. At the end 
of the experiment, you will be paid privately. Your total payoff in this experiment will 
consist of $5 as a participation fee (simply for showing up on time), plus whatever 
payoff you receive from the decision experiment. Details of how your payoff will 
depend on your decisions will be provided below. 
During the experiment, we will speak in terms of experimental tokens instead of 
dollars. Your payoffs will be calculated in terms of tokens and then translated at the 
end of the experiment into dollars at the following rate: 
2 Tokens = 1 Dollar 
 
The decision problem 
 
In this experiment, you will participate in 50 independent decision problems that share 
a common form. This section describes in detail the process that will be repeated in all 
decision problems and the computer program that you will use to make your decisions. 
In each decision problem, you will be asked to allocate tokens between two 
accounts, labeled x and y. The x account corresponds to the x -axis and the y account 
corresponds to the y-axis in a two-dimensional graph. Each choice will involve choos- 
ing a point on a line representing possible token allocations. Examples of lines that 
you might face appear in the graph below. Many lines are shown on the same graph 
to highlight that there will be a variety of different lines you could face, but each 
decision you make will involve only one line on the graph, as you will see further in 
these instructions. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
In each choice, you may choose any x and y pair that is on the line. For example, 
as illustrated in the next graph below, choice a represents a decision to allocate 14 
tokens in the x account and 70 tokens in the y account. Another possible allocation is 
b, in which you allocate 40 tokens in the x account and 30 tokens in the y account. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Each decision problem will start by having the computer select such a line randomly 
from the set of lines that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more tokens 
but with no intercept exceeding 100 tokens. The lines selected for you in different 
decision problems are independent of each other and independent of the lines selected 
for any of the other participants in their decision problems. 
To choose an allocation in each decision problem, use the mouse to move the 
pointer on the computer screen to the allocation that you desire. When you are ready 
to make your decision, left-click to enter your chosen allocation. After that, confirm 
your decision by clicking on the Submit button that will appear after your decision is 
made. Note that you can choose only x and y combinations that are on the line (you 
may also choose either endpoint on any line if you so desire). The next graph shows a 
picture of the actual decision screen you will see in the experiment. Notice that where 
you position the pointer on the line will highlight exactly what combination of x and y 
is at that location on the line. This same information is also shown in the information 
area to the right of the graph (the example graph shows additional information that 
will be discussed next in these instructions. It also indicates a 20 round experiment, 
although today’s experiment will be 50 rounds in length). 
 
 
 
Once you have confirmed your choice for that decision round, press the OK button. 
Your payoff in each decision round is determined by the number of tokens in your 
x account and the number of tokens in your y account. At the end of the round, the 
computer will randomly select one of the accounts, x or y. There is an equal chance 
that either account will be selected, and this random selection occurs separately and 
independently of each participant. You will only receive as payment the number of 
 
 
 
tokens you allocated to the account that was chosen. (In the example graph directly 
above, if account x is selected you would receive 22.7 tokens, and if account y is 
selected you would receive 56 tokens). The random selection of account x or y in a 
decision round will not be shown to you until the very end of the experiment. 
Once a decision round is finished, you will be asked to make an allocation in another 
independent decision. This process will be repeated until all 50 decision rounds are 
completed. At the end of the last round, you will be informed that the experiment has 
ended. 
 
Your earnings 
 
Your earnings in the experiment are determined as follows. At the end of the exper- 
iment, the computer will randomly select one decision round to carry out (that is, 1 
out of 50). The round selected depends solely upon chance, and it is equally likely 
that any round will be chosen. Once a round is chosen, you will receive the number 
of tokens you allocated to the account (x or y) that was randomly selected for that 
round. Keep in mind that there is an equal chance that account x or y will be chosen 
for your token payoff in any given round. 
The round selected, your choice and your payment (in terms of tokens) will be 
shown in the large window that appears at the center of the program dialog window. 
At the end of the experiment, the tokens will be converted into money. Each token 
will be worth 0.5 dollars (in other words, your “tokens” payoff will be divided by 2 
to get your payoff in dollars). Your final cash earnings in the experiment will be your 
earnings in the round selected plus the $5 show-up fee. You will receive your payment 
as you leave the experiment. 
 
Rules 
 
Please do not share your decisions with anyone else in today’s experiment, please do 
not talk with anyone during the experiment, and please remain silent until everyone is 
finished. If there are no further questions, you are ready to start, and an experimenter 
will start your experiment program. 
 
Appendix 2A: Pre-experiment online survey (answered prior to recruit- 
ment) 
 
(some responses elicited using slider bars, matrix response boxes, or other standard 
online survey features) 
—————————— 
What is your gender? 
• Female 
• Male 
Please enter your valid email address (e.g., johndoe@emailserver.com) 
 
 
 
This is required if you wish to be entered into the database for eligibility and 
recruitment consideration for future cash-compensation research experiments 
 
 
 
What is your ethnicity? 
• Hispanic or Latino 
• Not Hispanic or Latino 
What is your racial category? 
• American Indian/Alaska Native 
• Asian 
• Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
• Black or African American 
• White (Caucasian) 
• Mixed 
• Other (please specify in text box) 
What is your age? 
Are you a student, faculty, or staff? 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by the following problems? 
(Options for each are “Not at all”, “Several Days”, “Over Half of the Days”, or “Nearly 
Every Day”) 
• Feeling nervous, anxious or on edge 
• Not being able to stop or control worrying 
• Worrying too much about different things 
• Little interest or pleasure in doing things 
• Trouble relaxing 
• Being so restless that it is hard to sit still 
• Becoming easily annoyed or irritable 
• Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 
• Felling afraid as if something awful might happen. 
Considering only your own “feeling best” rhythm, at what time would you get up if 
you were entirely free to plan your day? 
• Between 5:00 and 6:30 a.m. 
• Between 6:31 and 8:00 a.m. 
• Between 8:01 and 9:30 a.m. 
• Between 9:31 and 11:00 a.m. 
• Between 11:01 a.m. and noon 
During the first half-hour after waking up in the morning, how tired do you feel? 
• Very tired 
• Fairly tired 
• Fairly refreshed 
• Very refreshed 
 
 
 
At what time in the evening do you feel tired and, as a result, in need of sleep? 
• Between 8:00 pm and 9:00 pm 
• Between 9:01 pm and 10:30 pm 
• Between 10:31 pm and 12:30 am 
• Between 12:31 am and 2:00 am 
• Between 2:01 am and 3:00 am 
At what time of the day do you think you reach your “feeling best” peak? 
• Between midnight and 4:30 a.m. 
• Between 4:31 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. 
• Between 7:31 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. 
• Between 9:31 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. 
• Between 4:31 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. 
• Between 9:31 p.m. and midnight. 
One hears about “morning” and “evening” types of people. Which ONE of these types 
do you consider yourself to be? 
• Definitely a ‘morning-type’ 
• More likely a ‘morning-type’ than an ‘evening-type’ 
• More likely an ‘evening-type’ than a ‘morning-type’ 
• Definitely an ‘evening-type’ 
Over the last 7 nights, what is the average amount of sleep you obtained each night? 
Last night, how much sleep did you get? 
What do you feel is the optimal amount of sleep for you personally to get each 
night? (optimal in terms of next day alertness, performance, and functionality for you 
personally.) 
How likely are you to doze off or fall asleep in the following situations, in contrast 
to just feeling tired? This refers to your usual way of life in recent times. Even if you 
have not done some of these things recently, try to work out how they would have 
affected you. 
(options are “would NEVER doze or fall asleep”, “SLIGHT chance of dozing or 
falling asleep”, “MODERATE chance of dozing or falling asleep”, or “HIGH chance 
or dozing or falling asleep”) 
• Sitting and reading 
• Watching TV 
• Sitting, inactive in a public place (e.g., a theater or a meeting) 
• As a passenger in a car for an hour 
• Lying down to rest in the afternoon when circumstances permit 
• Sitting and talking to someone 
• Sitting quietly after lunch without alcohol 
• In a car, while stopped for a few minutes in traffic. 
Do you have a diagnosed sleep disorder? 
• Yes 
• No 
• Not diagnosed, but I believe I may have a sleep disorder 
If you responded “Yes” (i.e., you have a diagnosed sleep disorder), what is it? 
Appendix 2B: Survey given during experiment 
APPENDIX 28- Survey given during experiment 
DECISION DAY SURVEYS SUBJECT  NUMBER/CODE. _ 
•••uu•••**""PLEASE ANSWER BEFORE DECISION TASKS"" .......... ........ .. 
Please circle the number that best corresponds to how sleepy you feel riaht now. You may mark any 
number, but mark only one number (numbers in between those with descriptions correspond to feeling 
in between the two identified states). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Extremely Alert Neither Sleepy Extremely 
Alert Alert nor Sleepy 
Sleepy (fighting 
sleep} 
•••••••••• ••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••• •••••• 
 
DECISION DAY SURVEYS SUBJECT  NUMBER/CODE, _ 
•••••••••• ••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••• •••••• 
u•******•******•***PLEASE ANSWER THIS QUESTION AFTER DECISION TASKS******•**** 
•••••••••• ••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
For the followln1three questions. please be as precise as posslble (e.1•• hours and minutes). 
Over the last 7 nights, what is the average amount of sleep you obtained each night? ----- 
Last night, how much sleep did you get?------ 
What do you feel is the optimal amount of sleep for you personally to get each night? (optimal in terms 
of next day alertness, performance, and functionality) --------- 
•••••••••• ••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••• ••••• ••••••••••••••••••••• •••••• 
Please answer the following 3 questions 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost? 
My response _ 
If it takes S machines S minutes to make S widgets, how long wou Id it take 
100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
My response _ 
In a lake,there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch dou bles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it 
take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
My response _ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
     
     
 
 
    
 
     
 
 
    
 
     
 
     
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2C: Technical details of preference function tests 
 
1. Testing expected utility theory. 
A test of expected utility in asset markets has been proposed by Varian (1983), 
and a maintained assumption of Varian’s test is that the Bernoulli utility function over 
money is concave, i.e., individuals are risk averse. Recently, Polisson et al. (2015) 
have proposed an alternative test of expected utility that does not rely on assuming 
risk aversion. 
The test by Polisson et al. consists of finding a set of numbers, i.e., utilities, that 
are consistent with the observed revealed preference relation and with an extension 
of the observed revealed preference relation over the lattice of points generated by 
the experiment.22 Polisson et al. also propose a way to calculate a number similar to 
Afriat’s critical cost to efficiency corresponding to the test of expected utility theory. 
We use the approach by Polisson et al. to test for adherence to expected utility 
theory. 
2. Testing rank-dependent utility.
To test for rank-dependent utility in asset markets, we propose a straightforward
generalization of Varian’s (1983) test of expected utility to allow for the possibility of 
rank-dependent valuation of outcomes. 
It should be noted that rank-dependent utility can be tested in asset market experi- 
ments even if the probability of states of nature does not vary. A simple example will 
illustrate this point. Consider we observe the following three revealed preference rela- 
tions: (x1, y1)R(x2, y2), (x3, y2)R(x1, y3) and (x2, y3)R(x3, y1) where aRb means a 
is revealed preferred to b. We also assume that x1 < y1, x2 > y2, y1 > x3, x3 > y2
and x2 > y3. 
These allocations are not consistent with expected utility theory. To see this, suppose 
u rationalizes the choices above when the probability of obtaining asset x is p (0 < 
p < 1). We must have that: 
i. u(x1)p + u(y1)(1 − p) > u(x2)p + u(y2)(1 − p)
ii. u(x3)p + u(y2)(1 − p) > u(x1)p + u(y3)(1 − p)
iii. u(x2)p + u(y3)(1 − p) > u(x3)p + u(y1)(1 − p)
Adding inequalities (i) and (ii), we obtain that u(x3)p + u(y1)(1 − p) > u(x2)p + 
u(y3)(1 − p), which contradicts inequality (iii). 
However, these inequalities do not contradict rank-dependent utility theory. Let 
w(p) be the probability weight of p. This theory requires that 
i. (1 − w(1 − p))u(x1) + w(1 − p)u(y1) > (1 − w(p))u(y2) + w(p)u(x2)
ii. (1 − w(p))u(y2) + w(p)u(x3) > (1 − w(1 − p))u(x1) + w(1 − p)u(y3)
iii. (1 − w(p))u(y3) + w(p)u(y2) > (1 − w(1 − p))u(x3) + w(1 − p)u(y1)
Consider inequality (i). By assumption, x1 < y1 and x1 obtains with probability p 
and y1 obtains with probability 1-p. Rank-dependent utility theory weighs the lower 
ranked outcome, x1, with weight 1 − w(1 − p), with the probability that outcomes are 
larger than x1 (w(1) = 1) minus the probability that outcomes are strictly larger than 
x1 (w(1–p)). Similarly, rank-dependent utility theory weighs the largest outcome, y1, 
with the probability that outcomes are larger than y1 (w(1–p)) minus the probability 
that outcomes are strictly larger than y1 (w(0) = 0). The remaining expressions are 
obtained in a similar manner. 
 
22 In particular, suppose a person is observed choosing allocation (x,y) in menu 1 and (a,b) in menu 2 for 
an experiment with two essential Arrow–Debreu securities. The observed quantities in this experiment are 
A = {0,x,y,a,b} and the associated lattice to the experiment is A×A. A preference relation can be extended 
to this lattice by checking whether x in A×A was affordable when (x,y) in menu 1 was chosen or when 
(a,b) in menu 2 was chosen. 
Adding up inequalities (i) and (ii), we obtain that w(1 − p)u(y1) + w(p)u(x3) > 
w(1 − p)u(y3) + w(p)u(x2). This inequality would violate rank-dependent utility the- 
ory if w(1-p) = 1-w(p) which is not true in general. It is easy to show that if either 
xi > yi or xi < yi for = 1, 2, 3, this pattern of behavior would also violate rank- 
dependent utility. 
In sum, it is possible to test for rank-dependent utility theory separated from 
expected utility even if probabilities are fixed. This follows from the fact that proba- 
bility weighting depends on the rank of outcomes. 
We now show how to test for rank-dependent utility theory in the context of two 
essential Arrow–Debreu securities. Let the consumption data be (xik , pik , πik ), i = 1, 
2, k = 1,…, N, where xik , pik , πik are consumption bundles of state contingent assets, 
their prices and the probability of each state i. 
In the context of two state-contingent assets, rank-dependent utility theory is equiv- 
alent to the following representation of preferences: 
u(x1k , x2k ) = (1 − w(π2k ))u(x1k ) + w(π2k )u(x2k ) if x1k ≤ x2k and 
u(x1k , x2k ) = w(π1k )u(x1k ) + (1 − w(π1k ))u(x2k ) if x1k > x2k 
where u is a monotone increasing value function and w is a monotone increasing 
probability weighting function with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1. 
Because rank-dependent utility theory evaluates lottery prizes according to their 
ranks, the utility representation of preferences is not differentiable everywhere. In 
particular, the corresponding indifference curves will have a kink whenever x1k = x2k. 
To derive the testable hypotheses of rank-dependent utility with a concave value 
function, we note that if u is differentiable a consumer choosing (x1k , x2k ), where 
x1k > x2k solves the following problem: 
maxx1k,x2k {w(π1k )u(x1k ) + (1 − w(π1k ))u(x2k ) : p1kx1k + p2kx2k ≤ 1} 
with a symmetric representation for the case in which x1k < x2k. 
Whenever x1k = x2k, the problem is equivalent to the simultaneous solution of the 
following problems: 
maxx1k,x2k {w(π1k )u(x1k ) + (1 − w(π1k ))u(x2k ) : p1k x1k + p2k x2k ≤ 1, ifx1k ≥ x2k }, and 
maxx1k,x2k {(1 − w(π2k ))u(x1k ) + w(π2k )u(x2k ) : p1k x1k + p2k x2k ≤ 1, ifx1k ≤ x2k } 
If the function u is concave, first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a maximum. For decisions with x1k > x2k, we will have that 
ut(x1k ) = λkp1k /w(π1k ) and ut(x2k ) = λkp2k /(1 − w(π1k )), and for decisions 
with x1k < x2k, we will have that ut(x1k ) = λkp1k /(1 − w(π2k )) and ut(x2k ) = 
λkp2k /w(π2k ). Where λk denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the prob- 
lem. Whenever x1k = x2k all these conditions hold simultaneously. In such a case, it 
is possible for λik, i = 1, 2, to vary for each separate case. Diewert (2012) discusses 
the conditions under which it is possible to find numbers that satisfy the first-order 
conditions of the problem. 
Below we establish the system of linear inequalities associated with rank-dependent 
utility theory with a concave value function. Since, function u is concave, we know 
that 
u(xik ) ≤ u(xjm ) + ut(xjm )(xik − xjm ) 
Using the first-order conditions of the associated problem, we have that 
u(xik ) ≤ u(xim ) + (λmpjm /w(πjm ))(xik − xjm ) if xjm > x−j,m 
u(xik ) ≤ u(xim ) + (λmpjm /(1 − w(π−j,m )))(xik − xjm )ifxjm < x−j,m 
In the case xjm = x−j,m, both equations above hold for potentially different values 
of λj,m, j = 1, 2. 
A concave rank-dependent utility representation of preferences exists if there are 
positive numbers {u1k, u2k , λ1k , λ2k }23 and numbers {w1k, w2k }24 between 0 and 1 
satisfying the above equations. The proof of the existence of a rank-dependent utility 
representation of preferences if the above inequalities are satisfied follows standard 
arguments. 
We follow Diewert (2012) in introducing a new variable S (S≥0) to be added to 
all the Afriat inequalities above which equals 0 only if the system of equations has a 
solution. We also follow Diewert (2012) in restricting λ to be larger than one25 and 
normalizing income to be equal to one. This slack variable can be used to assess the 
fitness of the data with respect to rank-dependent expected utility. Consider that a 
subject is an expected utility maximizer. Adding up the inequalities, we find 
π1mu(x1k ) + π2mu(x2k ) ≤ π1mu(x1m ) + π2mu(x2m ) + λm (p1mx1k + p2kx2k
−p1mx1m − p2mx2m ) 
and because income is assumed to be equal to one, we have that 
π1mu(x1k ) + π2mu(x2k ) ≤ π1mu(x1m ) + π2mu(x2m ) + λm (p1mx1k + p2kx2k − 1) 
A violation of expected utility would occur if the utility of allocation (x1k, x2k ) is 
preferred to allocation (x1m , x2m ) and it was affordable when (x1m , x2m ) was chosen. 
The equation above would then be violated. Suppose that income is adjusted to level 
1 − ε such that allocation (x1k , x2k) is not longer affordable. The minimum value that 
variable ε takes gives a measure of how much the model departs from the theoretical 
assumptions. Note that variable ε holds a relationship with the slack variable S since 
maxk {λk ε} will solve the equations above. Since λ is always larger than one, the 
variable S gives us an upper bound of the value of ε. In the analysis below, we use 
 
23 λ1k = λ2k whenever x1k and x2k are different. These numbers are restricted to be positive. 
24 w1k = w2k if p1k = p2k = 1/2. Only one of the two numbers is necessary if x1k and x2k are different. 
25 The normalization is possible because the inequalities are homogeneous of degree one in u and λ. 
Fig. 5  Distribution of critical cost to efficiency (CCEI) for test of expected utility (Polisson et al. 2015) 
1-S as an estimate of the lower bound of the critical cost to efficiency for the test of 
rank-dependent utility. 
3. Results.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of Afriat’s critical cost to efficiency (CCEI) cor-
responding to the test of expected utility developed by Polisson et al. (2015). The 
mean CCEI of circadian matched subjects is 0.891 and mean CCEI of the circadian 
mismatch subjects is 0.876. These means are not statistically significantly different (t 
test = 0.7697, p value = 0.4424, rank sum test p value = 0.5033). Only two subjects, 
both of them circadian mismatched, have a CCEI equal to 1. This means that only two 
subjects satisfy conditions for expected utility without any violations of the theory. 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of Afriat’s critical cost to efficiency (CCEI) corre- 
sponding to the test of rank-dependent expected utility with a concave utility function 
and w(1/2) ≤ 1/2. While the test presented in Sect. 2 does not require w(1/2) ≤ 1/2, 
we consider it to be a natural restriction given the clustering of decisions around the 
50-50 allocation. The mean CCEI of circadian matched subjects is 0.797 and mean 
CCEI of the circadian mismatch subjects is 0.817. These means are not statistically sig- 
nificantly different (t test = 0.7844, p value = 0.4337, rank sum test p value = 0.8434). 
Only two subjects, both of them circadian mismatched, pass the rank-dependent utility 
test without any violations (CCEI = 1). 
The test of rank-dependent utility implicitly finds a value for a subject’s weight for 
probability 1/2. We find that these estimates are not statistically different according to 
a t test (0.6869, p value = 0.4930), but they are different according to the rank sum test 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Distribution of Critical Cost to Efficiency (CCEI) for test of rank-dependent utility with concave 
utility function and w(1/2)≤1/2 
 
 
(p value = 0.0480). To check if there is a difference in estimated probability weight 
of 1/2, we test if the proportion having weights below 1/2 is different across groups. 
Thirty-three percent of circadian matched subjects have estimated weights below 1/2 
and 21 % of circadian mismatched subjects have weights below 1/2. These proportions 
are statistically different (t test = −1.9662, p value = 0.0507). This provides additional 
support that circadian matched subjects are more likely to choose safe options than 
circadian mismatched subjects. 
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